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ABSTRACT 
Using panel data from the four waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey in 1993, 1997, 2000 
and 2007 we investigate the prerequisite for and contribution of micro-family-businesses to 
economic development. We find that family-owned firms are on average fairly profitable 
compared with the industrial sector profit standard. Failure rates between 1997 and 2000 are very 
low (about 10%), while the industrial sector experimented a massive shakeout of about 33% in the 
wake of the 1997 crisis (Ter Wengel & Rodriguez, 2006), with an increase in the number of 
family-businesses between the two years of observation.  
This paper contributes to the economics of entrepreneurship studies by continuing the discussion 
of entrepreneurship in hostile business environments (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008).  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is key to employment, innovation and growth (Acs & Mueller, 2008), and as 
such, has been the subject of tremendous research in both the economic and management 
literatures since Solow (1957), Schumpeter (1934, 1943), and Penrose (1959). The presence or 
lack of entrepreneurs in the economy is recognised as being a key factor in the success or failure 
of countries to grow (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001c). Further studies focus on the conditions of 
existence of entrepreneurship, influential factors invoked are historical, cultural, social, 
institutional, or purely economic (Thurik 1996; 1999). Of particular interest, are the factors that 
lay the ground for business survival and good performance (Chrisman et al., 1999; Edelman et al., 
2005; Short et al. 2009). However, previous research on this central question has led toward 
fragmented and controversial results (Koeller & Lechler, 2005). 
The study of the importance of entrepreneurship in economic growth can be led via the study of 
businesses, and in particular small ones. As Thurik & Wennekers (2004) note “In short, the focus 
has shifted from small businesses as a social good that should be maintained at an economic cost 
to small businesses as a vehicle for entrepreneurship” p.142. While this has become clear in the 
case of developed countries, the role of small businesses in the case of emerging countries is still 
seen in a Lewisian perspective, where the small and often informal sector is considered as an 
unlimited pool of labour for the large industrial sector. Thurik (2009) suggests that in spite of 
advances in the theory of endogenous growth and evidence in the increasing importance of R&D 
in economic growth that should imply that firms need economies of scale to survive and perform, 
we witness the increasing importance of small businesses and entrepreneurship. Thurik (2009) 
indeed precises that “Audretsch and Thurik (2001a; 2004) call this the switch from the managed 
economy to the entrepreneurial economy” p.2. In the context of developing economies, the focus 
has been on the “managed economy” of large scale industries, while the small scale sector is still 
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considered as unproductive. Naudé (2007) underlines the need for research in the area of the 
“mixed model” of managerial and entrepreneurial economy. 
Using cross-country firm data analysis, La Porta & Schleifer (2008) confirm the fact that informal 
micro-businesses provide on average half of all economic activity in developing countries. They 
find that these are utterly unproductive compared to formal firms, and conclude that the informal 
sector serves as a social security net “keep[ing] millions of people alive, but disappearing over 
time” (abstract). 
Robison (1986), Hill (1996, 1997) points to the fact that in Indonesia, small businesses were 
mostly left out of development programmes because they were supposed less productive and 
having less productivity potential than larger ones. Vial (2008) challenges this view and shows 
that small firms (20 to 100 employees) represent about 70% of firms, 12% of total output, but 
contribute to 25% of total factor productivity growth on average over the period 1975-94 in the 
medium and large scale manufacturing sector (Table 10, p.316). 
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the entry, survival, and performance of micro 
family owned firms in the specific context of hostile environments. Indeed, we observe that, if 
small informal family firms are still considered as a cost for emerging economies, some studies 
also find that small family firms survive and perform in hostile environment because they are 
more flexible and use their social capital and family network. Authors also underline that we need 
to move from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy. Indeed, the literature has focused on 
how to manage the economy to reach economic growth, rather than on how to foster 
entrepreneurship. However, empirical findings put forward that the bulk of firms are small and 
often informal and family-owned in emerging countries. The challenge is to reconcile the fact that 
the small informal family sector is still considered as unproductive, short-term and a social safety 
net, while considering that it could potentially be a massive engine for growth. 
To conduct our research we use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995 ; 
Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al., 2004; Strauss et al., 2009). This survey covers on 
average over 10,000 households/year, and consists in 4 waves (1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007) in 13 
of the 27 provinces, accounting for 83% of the total Indonesian population. 
We investigate the prerequisite for and contribution of micro-family-businesses to economic 
development by addressing the following three questions: 
1. What conditions the entry of the family owned firms in a hostile environment such as 
Indonesia? 
2.  What conditions the survival of the family owned firms in a hostile environment 
such as Indonesia? 
3. Are households owning and operating family firms better off than households that do 
not? 
The next three sections review the literature on hostile environments, definitions of small family 
and potentially informal firms, as well as measurement issues regarding those firms. We then 
proceed to the presentation of the data and our empirical methodology. We then present the results 
regarding MFBs entry, survival and performance. The last section concludes and provides policy 
implications. 
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HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Covin & Slevin (1989 & 2000) are probably among the first scholars to study the performance of 
small firms in hostile environment. In doing so, they define some of the aspects of a hostile 
environment such as “precarious industry settings, intense competition, harsh, overwhelming 
business climates, and the relative lack of exploitable opportunities” (p.75). In their study of the 
performance of entrepreneurship and family businesses in Lithuania, Dyer & Mortensen (2005) 
refine the definition and present hostile environments in transition and emerging economies as 
displaying the following characteristics: 
“(1) declining gross domestic product; (2) declining purchasing power, typically due to high 
inflation; (3) lack of skilled workers due to a poor education system, out-migration, or declining 
population; (4) lack of infrastructure, for example, transportation, banking, communications, and 
utilities; (5) corruption and lack of legal protection; (6) excessive governmental intrusion, for 
example, tax laws and burdensome regulations; and (7) political uncertainty, social unrest, or war 
(see Covin & Slevin, 1989; Dubini, 1988; Puffer & McCarthy, 2001). Such environments stand in 
stark contrast to more “munificent” environments that foster economic activity (Dess & Beard, 
1984; Tan, 2001)”(p.247). 
We argue that emerging countries represent such a specific context, and can be described as 
hostile to entrepreneurship for several reasons: small-scale entrepreneurs represent the bulk of 
entrants, turnover rates are high in the first few years for at least two reasons – competition among 
small entrants is fierce, and larger incumbents try to deter either entry or growth through different 
barriers such as the usual economy of scale effect and reputation, but also through cronyism and 
corruption. Beside issues of fair and less fair competition, small entrepreneurs are generally not 
supported by prevailing institutions at large, as in the early phases of development, large and 
already settled firms receive most support by the government. In later phases of development, 
because of the entrenchment problem, it proves difficult to move support systems from large to 
small firms. Also, because of a combination of low income, corruption, and absence of law 
enforcement, a large chunk of small enterprises go unregistered – the informal sector – preventing 
the authorities to study closely the needs of this sector. 
Baumol (1990) distinguishes unproductive and productive entrepreneurship, and defines them 
respectively as “unproductive political and legal activities” and “productive market activities”. He 
argues that the quality of institutions such as property rights protection or rule of law enforcement 
influence the extent to which either unproductive or productive entrepreneurship dominate the 
economy. According to his theory, low quality institutions foster the development of unproductive 
entrepreneurship, while higher quality institutions favour the spread of productive 
entrepreneurship. In order to test empirically the influence of environment hostility on 
entrepreneurship, Sobel (2008) uses data on 48 U.S. states to assess the relationship between 
institutional quality and the type of entrepreneurship, and confirms Baumol’s theory. While testing 
the hypothesis on 48 U.S. states allows to assess the effect of varying institutional quality levels on 
entrepreneurship, we can fairly say that from an international point of view, the institutional 
difference that exist between Texas and the state of New York is no common measure with the 
institutional difference that exist between the U.S and an emerging country such as Indonesia or 
even Mexico. 
The aim of the paper is therefore to study entrepreneurship within an extreme case of environment 
hostility: in emerging countries, new ventures are generally small, and face both a relative within 
and between hostility: emerging economies are characterised by generally lower quality 
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institutions than developed economies, and within emerging economies, new ventures face a more 
hostile environment than and larger and more settled firms. 
In this framework, the case of Asia is of particular interest because it does not seem to display 
simple relationships between institutional quality, entrepreneurship and growth. We refer in 
particular to the so-called “Asian Paradox” as presented by Rock & Bonnet (2004) or Vial & 
Hanoteau (2010) who show that in Asian economies, corruption does not hamper business or 
entrepreneurship as shown by high entry figures, that corruption can serve greasing the wheel, and 
that corruption might even be triggering higher firm growth and productivity. Also, Covin & 
Slevin (1989 & 2000) find that in hostile environment, firms with characteristics linked to 
flexibility such as organic structure were more able to survive. Dyer & Mortensen (2005) find that 
firms constructing social capital and family networks to overcome environment hostility perform 
better than the rest. 
SMALL BUSINESS, FAMILY BUSINESS, INFORMALITY AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT 
The literature on the various definitions of family businesses is prolific and, according to Sharma 
(2007), can be classified into two main streams: the components approach and the essence 
approach, respectively answering the “what and when”, and “how” questions. Klein et al. (2005) 
or Westhead & Cowling (1998) focus on the components approach to defining family businesses 
and distinguish different types of family businesses depending on factors such as family 
management, ownership and succession. While the literature on family businesses does not reach a 
consensus as to a definitive definition of the family business unit, we choose an empirical 
definition linked to the components approach. We study a particular form of family businesses that 
are defined as small businesses that are entirely or partially owned by one or several members of 
the same household, and in which one or several members of the household work. This definition 
covers at the same time the ownership and management dimensions, as well as two new 
dimensions. These include firstly the provision of non-managerial labour input in the business, and 
secondly the size of the business. 
Carter (2010), in particular writes that “The close, often inseparable, relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the firm suggests that decisions about the individual’s financial rewards are 
rarely clearcut; rather, they are often ad hoc, short term and reversible. Moreover, decisions about 
financial rewards are not only determined by business rationality, but are influenced by family and 
household needs (Ram, 2001; Aldrich and Cliff, 2003). Hence, the analysis of entrepreneurial 
rewards requires an approach that captures the processes and dynamics of reward decision making 
over the business lifecycle, while contextualizing decisions within the entrepreneurial household 
(Wheelock and Baines, 1998; Zahra, 2007)” p.3. 
Seminal work by Sandberg and Hofer (1987) introduced a theoretical framework for new venture 
performance that has been used and refined over the years. They proposed a model where 
performance of the firm is a function of the entrepreneur’s attributes, the strategy used by the firm 
and the industry structure in which the firm operates (Sandberg & Hofer, 1987). Attributes of 
entrepreneurs (personality characteristics, values, beliefs, experience, social capital) and their 
impacts on performance have been the subject of many studies (Gartner, 1988). If results on the 
personality characteristics and value of the entrepreneurs were inconclusive, expertise, social and 
human capitals have demonstrated their importance in the identification and exploitation of 
opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Gartner, 1988; Shane, 2000).  
Capitalizing on these works, new elements (resources, organizational structure of the firm and 
processes) were added to provide a more comprehensive model (Chrisman et al., 1999, Song et al. 
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2008). However, if the different studies led toward fragmented and controversial results, all 
authors agree on the complexity of identifying and understanding the drivers of new ventures 
performance as it appears that performance is affected by a vast array of variables whose 
relationships between them are not always clear.    
Moreover, if those studies recognize the importance of environment and industry structure as key 
elements, none of them have empirically investigated new venture creation and performance in the 
specific context of hostile environment emerging countries face generally or how firms evolving 
in the informal sector are impacted.  
SMALL INFORMAL FAMILY BUSINESSES IN INDONESIA 
Perry (2007) provides an extensive overview of the informal sector in the developing world and 
refers several times to the historical Indonesian bazaar economy and in particular underlines that 
“Geertz’s (1963) study of the bazaar economy in Indonesia, describes entrepreneurs who, in fact, 
lack the organizational skills to function as a modern firm, let alone grow to a large size. Very 
poorly educated workers, many less than a generation away from subsistence farming, would also, 
on average, have low ability levels in running a firm.” p.26. 
Booth (1998) p. 291, about colonial entrepreneurship, building on van der Eng (1991) and van der 
Kolff (1941 & 1956): “The real problem was not that indigenous Indonesian were prevented by an 
inherent lack of commercial ability from participating in the market economy. Rather, it was that 
large and powerful conglomerates were allowed to subvert market forces to the detriment of 
smaller producers. Another revealing strand in colonial thinking about the role of the market can 
be found in van Gelderen’s assertion that the indigenous cultivator was likely to be exploited in his 
or her dealings with the market economy because of the ‘great difference in bargaining power 
between the buyer on the one hand and the seller on the other’ (van Gelderen 1927, p.147).” The 
authors make here reference to the Chinese middlemen. For the Suharto era, Booth (1998, pp.320-
321) also reports that in spite of a century of market participation, half a century of independence, 
the fact that pribumi are in majority in the country, and that wider access to education and capital 
has been granted, indigenous Indonesian still do not control their economy. Indeed, in 1989 for 
example, the top 10 of largest groups are owned by Indonesian families of Chinese origin, and in 
the top 40, only 12 groups were held by pribumi, among which four closely connected to 
Suharto’s family. 
For many years, productivity of small firms were believed to be lower than large groups and this 
reasoning led to public policies that excluded small firms from development programs (Robinson 
1986; Hill 1996 & 1997). New research findings using longitudinal data have provided a different 
view and shows that small firms represent about 70% of firms, 12% of total output, but contribute 
to 25% of total factor productivity growth on average over the period 1975-94 in the industrial 
sector (Vial, 2008, Table 10, p.316). 
By definition, data on the informal sector are difficult to obtain. However, Sethuraman (1997) 
suggests that in the 1980s 48% of manufacturing employment and 90% of trade and restaurant 
employment was situated in the informal sector. The World Bank (1993) reported that about 68% 
of the working population was active in the informal sector. 
We use results from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Indonesia conducted in 2003 to gather 
some information about the quality of the business environment. In this survey, 713 firms are 
surveyed, among which 8 small firms (less than 20 employees), 335 medium firms (between 20 
and 99 employees), and 368 large firms (100 employees and over). We acknowledge the limitation 
of the results given that only 8 small firms have been interviewed and that these have on average 
12.75 full-time permanent employees, which is quite large, even for small firms. With regards to 
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environment hostility, the study shows in particular that, relative to their medium and large 
counterparts, a far larger percentage of small firms are expected to give gifts to officials in order to 
get operating and importing licenses, construction permits, electrical, phone, or water connections, 
and securing government contracts. Regarding the issue of informality and/or fraud, the study 
shows that regardless of their size, 44.04% of surveyed firms express that a typical firm reports 
less than 100% of sales for tax purposes. This is in particular true for small firms (75%) and 
medium firms (54.93%), and less so for large firms (33.70%) even though the percentage remains 
important. 
Tambunan (2007) studies small firms in Indonesia and reports in particular that “According to 
official data from the Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises (Menegkop and 
UKM), SEs in 1997 accounted for more than 39.7 million units, or constituted about 99.8 percent 
of the total number of enterprises in the country in that year, and increased to more than 40 million 
units in 2004” (p.99). In 2000-2003, those enterprises contribute more to total employment (about 
90%) than to output (40.55%), showing productivity levels that are about 10 times lower than their 
medium and large counterparts. However, small firms contributed by 2.02 and 1.68 percentage 
points to an overall GDP growth of 4.92% and 4.1% in 2000 and 2003 respectively. 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
We use the IFLS database compiled and published by RAND Corporation. The data is a rich 
community, households, and individuals panel dataset in four waves: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007. We 
use aggregate individual data, we focus on households data in order to study micro-family-owned 
businesses. 
IFLS data covers on average roughly over 10,000 households per year on the 4 waves. Households 
were interviewed in 13 of the 27 provinces as defined before 2001. Those 13 provinces were 
targeted because accounting for 83% of the population. A full description of the data is provided 
in Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995 ; Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al., 2004; Strauss et al., 
2009. 
We deflate all monetary values such as households’ assets in Rupiah with the World Development 
Indicators Consumer Price Index base 100 in 2000. 
The panel data unit is the household, of which we have the size in number of household members. 
We are able to identify households’ location through an urban dummy that equals 1 if the 
household is situated in an urban area, 0 if it is situated in a rural area. We also use the district 
location of each household. The MFB dummy indicates whether or not a household runs a micro-
family business. We focus on non-farm MFBs, as farm businesses represent a special type of 
economic activity. Another dummy indicates whether or not the household owns 100% of its 
MFB. About 95% of households running a MFB own it at 100%. Most MFB are 1-person 
businesses, and we do have an indication of the number of workers active in each MFB. We are 
also able to count the number of household’s members that are in wage employment, as opposed 
to being self-employed. The social capital variable is a dummy that indicated whether the 
household participates to a community activity called arisan and that represents one of the main 
social activities in Indonesia. We account for human capital by indicating the maximum education 
level attained by any of the household members. The perception of corruption is an index that 
answers to the following question “according to your opinion, are there any cases of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (KKN) in...”. This question is asked with regards to several items such as 
village level, district level, police, hospital or schools. We choose to focus on the village and the 
parliament district levels, as these are not strongly correlated with each other. Respondents, at the 
village level, have the choice between four answers: “yes”, “no”, “refuse to answer” and “don’t 
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know”. We chose to work with a lower bound of perception of corruption and our dummy equals 1 
if respondents answered “yes”, 0 otherwise. We did carry out robustness checks with upper bound 
treatments and this did not affect our results. We also use two infrastructure quality dummies at 
the village level. The first one relates to the quality of business permits emission, the second to 
transportation quality. Those dummies equal 1 if respondent estimated the quality to be “adequate” 
or “somewhat adequate”, 0 if respondent estimated that the quality was “not adequate” “far from 
adequate” “not available” or “don’t know”. Finally, we use figures on households’ assets and 
divide them by household size to obtain assets per capita. 
HYPOTHESES 
Hostile environments represent shaky institutional environments. Following Baumol (1990) and 
Sobel (2008), we hypothesise that weaker institutional quality characterised by relatively higher 
levels of unproductive corruption will deter entry. Refering to the Asian Paradox (Rock & Bonnett 
2004, Vial & Hanoteau, 2010), we also take into account the possible existence of productive 
corruption that might be beneficial to entry. Favorable business environment and infrastructure 
will potentially trigger entry. In order to counterbalance poor institutional quality, households 
setting up a business will need community-based as well as family-based social capital. The 
hypothesis regarding the role of education is mixed. While the literature underlines the positive 
relationship between education and entrepreneurship, in developing countries, one might expect 
individuals with higher education levels to seek a wage employment rather than setting up a 
business as they face a higher opportunity cost. 
 
H1: In hostile environments, the likelihood for households to engage in a MFB is 
positively associated with social capital, the size of the household (family-related 
social capital) and the quality of business environment, while it is negatively 
associated to the maximum education level in the household. 
Following Covin & Slevin (1989), we argue that the survival rates of MFBs is higher than the 
survival rates of medium- and large-scale firms in case of crisis such as the 1997 crisis. 
H2: MFBs in hostile environment have a higher survival rate than larger firms (in 
terms of number of firms and employment) in turbulent times. 
We argue that the survival of MFBs will be conditioned upon the same criteria than their entry. 
H3: The survival of MFBs is influenced by households’ characteristics such as 
human and social capital, size of household and alternative income sources and type 
of environment hostility. 
We argue that in family businesses, especially in developing countries, MFBs serve mostly to 
supplement households’ consumption and expenditures on consumables or assets. We therefore 
suggest that one way to apprehend MFB performance is to investigate the impact of MFB 
existence on households’ assets improvements. 
H4: MFBs revenues serve mostly as an additional source of consumption and 
expenditures for households, enhancing the overall well being of the household. 
We test the impact of MFB existence on households’ assets improvements, controlling for wage 
employment and initial households’ assets. 
H5: After controlling for wage employment and initial household assets, households 
with MFBs display higher end of period assets. 
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RESULTS 
In order to test our first hypothesis, we use a panel data logit model where the dependent variable 
is the existence of a MFB in the household , while the independent variables are the urban 
dummy , human capital 
 
as the maximum education attained by one or several members of 
the household, two social capital variables   (community-based and family-based social capital, 
that are respectively participation in arisan and household size), the number of household 
members in wage employment , two variables of corruption   (village 
 
perception of 
corruption at the village level, and village 
 
perception of corruption at the district parliament 
level), and two variables of infrastructure quality  (village 
 
perception of business permit 
emission service quality, and village 
 
perception of transportation quality). We cluster 
observations by geographical districts so as to have cluster-robust standard errors. 
 
(1)
 
 
H1.Table 1 reports our results for the period 1993-2007. As expected, the two social capital 
variables as well as the number of households’ members in wage employment have a positive 
impact of MFB existence, while the relatively higher human capital of households tends to reduce 
the probability of households to engage in MFB. The quality of service regarding the emission of 
business permits facilitates the existence of MFBs in households, but transportation quality has no 
significant impact, as those businesses are generally locally-based. Surprisingly, corruption at the 
village level has no significant impact on MFB existence, however, going in the sense of the Asian 
paradox mentioned earlier, corruption at the parliament district level has a significant positive 
impact on MFB existence, probably because corruption at a higher level serves the community by 
attracting resources from central government. Finally, urban households are more likely to run a 
non-farm business. 
H2. We compare IFLS hazard rates with hazard rates found on medium and large manufacturing 
plants using the Statistik Industri database compiled by BPS (Biro Pusat Statistic), a database 
compiling the entire population of firms with 20 employees or more. For the IFLS data, we keep 
only households that have been tracked down in the four waves from 1993 through to 2007 in 
order to rule out sample attrition. We are left with 6091 households. Results are displayed in Table 
2. The interesting result is that the entry rate is at its highest and the exit rate is at its lowest in 
1997, year of the Asian crisis, suggesting that MFBs might be absorbing excess unemployment 
triggered by exits in the medium and large scale sector. Indeed, in 1997, a mere 33% of these 
medium and large scale firms exited, resulting in relatively even larger employment losses. 
H3. After having investigated the determinants of MFB existence and shown that MFBs exit rates 
are lower than medium and large scale exit rates especially in times of crisis, we investigate the 
determinants of MFB exit. In order to do so, we use the Cox proportional hazard function in order 
to test for a link between survival probability and several explanatory factors. The model writes: 
 (2) 
where  indicates the resultant hazard depending on the values of the  
explanatory variables for the respective case and the respective survival time . 
The term represents the baseline hazard; i.e. the hazard in the case where all explanatory 
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variable values equal zero. Dividing both sides of the equation by the baseline hazard and using 
natural logarithms on both sides, the linear model writes:  
 (3) 
We test in what respect the determinants for MFB existence influence MFB survival probability, 
and allow the baseline hazard to vary by district and year of entry, offering a non-parametric 
account of their potential variations. 
Table 3 displays the results and shows that two parts of family-based social capital play in 
opposite directions. The size of households tends to drive MFB out of business more quickly, 
probably because of additional strain put on utilization of business income on households needs, 
while the number of households’ members that are in wage employment tend to support MFB 
survival. Once again, corruption at the village level does not have any significant effect on 
survival, while corruption at the district level tends to drive out businesses more quickly. Finally, 
the quality of infrastructure tends to encourage businesses to survive. 
H4. For the year 2007, the data compiled distinguishes between what the household consumed 
from the business activity, what the household spent for household needs from MFB income, and 
what was left over from this consumption in cash and kind. We computed that 75% of households 
owning an MFB had zero leftover from MFB revenues consumption, while 25% had a leftover of 
17% or more. This is a strong indication that MFBs owners have a tendency to mix household and 
business wallets and that looking at the rate of profits of these MFBs is misleading in terms of 
performance assessment. Another way to look at MFB performance is to investigate whether the 
running of an MFB in a household leads to long-term improvement of households assets. 
H5. In order to do so, we regress households’ assets per capita in 2007 on several elements. First, 
we control for initial households’ assets per capita in 1993, as initial assets conditions both 
consequent assets but also MFB existence, and control for the household being located in an urban 
area. We then add dummies that account for the existence of MFBs in households, distinguishing 
between the ones that entered in 1993, in 1997 or in 2000. We control for household size and 
employment status, as well as perception of corruption and infrastructure quality. 
 
(4) 
We cluster observations by geographical districts so as to have cluster-robust standard errors. 
Table 4 summarises the results. 
We find that initial assets affect positively long term assets, and that MFB existence, especially the 
ones started in the early period, also impact assets in 2007 positively. Smaller, urban households 
that count more wage employed members are better off. Corruption has no direct effect on assets, 
but infrastructure quality has. 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings imply that engagement in business, especially in the long-term, represent an 
opportunity for households in emerging economies to build on household assets and expand their 
choices and capabilities. Indeed, assets ownership is one of the core conditions for housing 
stability, ability to provide education for the youngest, ability to borrow money for opportunities 
improvement including business expansion. The existence and survival of these businesses could 
also absorb excess unemployment from the large-scale sector in times of crisis. In line with 
Baumol (1990) and Sobel (2008), we find that institutional quality in the form of good quality 
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administration and infrastructure is favourable to business existence and survival, and quality 
should be improved wherever it is still low. Interestingly, corruption does not seem to have a 
direct impact on small business: village level corruption does not impact MFBs, but parliament 
district corruption does. Our results suggests that parliament district corruption might be 
channelling economic opportunities at the district level, triggering more entries, and that 
mechanically, we observe more competition and exits in those districts. 
CONTACT: V. Vial, GRIDS, Euromed Management & DEFI, Université de la Méditerranée, 
France. virginie.vial@euromed-management.com  
REFERENCES 
Acs, Z. J. and P. Mueller (2008). "Employment effects of business dynamics: Mice, Gazelles and 
Elephants." Small Business Economics 30(1): 85-100. 
Audretsch and C.F. Bonser (eds) (2002), Globalization and Regionalization: Challenges for 
Public Policy, Boston/Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 49-70. 
Audretsch, D. B. and A. R. Thurik (2001). "What's New about the New Economy? Sources of 
Growth in the Managed and Entrepreneurial Economies." Industrial & Corporate Change 10(1). 
Audretsch, D. B. and M. Fritsch (2003). " Linking Entrepreneurship to Growth: The Case of West 
Germany." Industry & Innovation 10(1): 65. 
Audretsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik, 2001a, What is new about the new economy: sources of growth 
in the managed and entrepreneurial economies, Industrial and Corporate Change 19, 795-821. 
Audretsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik (2001b), Globalization and the strategic management of regions, 
in Globalization and Regionalization: Challenges for Public Policy, D.B. Audretsch and C.F. 
Bonser (eds), (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht): 49-70. 
Audretsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik, 2004, A model of the entrepreneurial economy, International 
Journal of Entrepreneurship Education 2, 143-166.  
Baumol, W.J., 1990. Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive and destructive. Journal of 
Political Economy 98 (5), 893–921. 
Booth, A., (1998), Indonesian Economic Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: 
A History of Missed Opportunities. Macmillan (London- Basingstoke). 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal,  D.A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128 – 152. 
Covin, J. G. and D. P. Slevin (1989). " Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile and 
Benign Environments." Strategic Management Journal 10(1): 75-87. 
Chrisman, J.J., Bauerschmidt, A., Hofer, C. (1999). The determinants of new venture 
performance: An extended model. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Fall, 5-29. 
Dejardin, M. 2001. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: An Obvious Conjunction?," 
Development and Comp Systems 0110010, EconWPA. 
Dyer Jr, W. G. and S. P. Mortensen (2005). "Entrepreneurship and Family Business in a Hostile 
Environment: The Case of Lithuania." Family Business Review 18(3): 247-258. 
Frankenberg, E. and D. Thomas, (2000), "The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS): Study Design 
and Results from Waves 1 and 2." March 2000. RAND, Santa Monica, CA. DRU-2238/1-
NIA/NICHD. 
11 
 
Frankenberg, E. and D. Thomas. "The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS): Study Design and 
Results from Waves 1 and 2." March 2000. RAND, Santa Monica, CA. DRU-2238/1-
NIA/NICHD. 
Frankenberg, E. and L. Karoly, (1995), "The 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey: Overview and 
Field Report." November, 1995. RAND, Santa Monica, CA. 
Gartner, W. B. (1988). "Who is an entrepreneur?" is the wrong question. American Journal of 
Small Business, 72(4), 11-32. 
Geertz, C. 1963. Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two 
Indonesian Towns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Hill, H. (1996). The Indonesian economy since 1966: Southeast Asia's emerging giant. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Hill, H. (1997). Indonesia's industrial transformation. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Klein, S. B., J. H. Astrachan, et al. (2005). "The F-PEC Scale of Family Influence: Construction, 
Validation, and Further Implication for Theory." Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 29(3): 321-
339. 
Kodithuwakku, S. S. and P. Rosa (2002). "The entrepreneurial process and economic success in a 
constrained environment." Journal of Business Venturing 17(5): 431. 
Koeller, C.T., Lechler, T.G. (2005). Economic and managerial perspective on new venture growth: 
An integrated analysis. Small Business and Economics, 26, 427-437. 
La Porta, R. and A. Shleifer (2008). "The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development." 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 275-352. 
Naudé, W., 2007, Entrepreneurship in economic development, Helsinki: World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, United Nations University  
North, D-C, 1997. "The Process of Economic Change," Research Paper 128, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. 
Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (reprinted in 
1968). 
Perry G., (2007), Informality: Exit and Exclusion, World Bank, 249p, 
http://books.google.fr/books?id=JXIQHXi_crAC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary
_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false  
Rama, M. (2001). The consequences of doubling the minimum wage: the case of Indonesia. 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 54(4): 864-881. 
Robison, R. (1986). Indonesia : The rise of capital. Allen & Unwin. 
Rock, M. & Bonnett, H. (2004). The comparative politics of corruption: Accounting for the East 
Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment. World Development, 
32(6), 999-1017. 
Sandberg, W. R., Hofer, C. W. (1987). Improving new venture performance: The role of strategy, 
industry structure, and the entrepreneur. Journal of Business Venturing, 2, 5-28. 
12 
 
Shane, S. (2000). Prior Knowledge and the Discovery of Entrepreneurial Opportunities.  
Organization Science, 11 (4): 448-469. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1943), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and Unwin. 
Sharma, P. and M. Nordqvist (2007), A Typology for Capturing the Heterogeneity of Family 
Firms, Academy of Management Proceedings. 
Sobel, R.S. (2008). Testing Baumol: Institutional quality and the productivity of entrepreneurship. 
Journal of business venturing, 23, 641-655. 
Solow, R. (1957) ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, pp. 312-20. 
Song, M., Podounitsyna, K., Bij, H., Halman, J.I.M. (2008). Success factors in new ventures: A 
meta analysis. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 25, 7-27. 
Strauss, J., F. Witoelar, B. Sikoki and A.M. Wattie.  "The Fourth Wave of the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS4): Overview and Field Report". April 2009. WR-675/1-NIA/NICHD. 
Strauss, J., K. Beegle, B. Sikoki, A. Dwiyanto, Y. Herawati and F. Witoelar,(2004). "The Third 
Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS): Overview and Field Report", March 2004. 
WR-144/1-NIA/NICHD. 
Tambunan, T., (2007). “Entrepreneurship development: SMEs in Indonesia”, Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship, Vol. 12, N.1, pp. 95-118. 
Ter Wengel, J. & Rodriguez, E. (2006). “Productivity and Firm Dynamics: Creative Destruction in 
Indonesian Manufacturing, 1994-2000”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 42, No3. 
Thurik & Wennekers, (2004). “Entrepreneurship, small business and economic growth”, Journal 
of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 11, N 1, pp. 140-149 
Thurik, A.R. (1996). Small firms, entrepreneurship and economic growth, in: Small Business in 
the Modern Economy, Z. Acs, B. Carlsson and A.R. Thurik (eds.), (Basil Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford): 126-152. 
Thurik, A.R. (1999). Entrepreneurship, industrial transformation and growth, in The Sources of 
Entrepreneurial Activity: Vol. 11, Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and 
Economic Growth, G.D. Libecap (ed.), (JAI Press, Stamford, CT): 29-65. 
Thurik, R. (2009). "Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth and Policy in Emerging Economies ", 
World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), Working Papers: UNU-
WIDER Research Paper RP2009/12: 18-18. 
Vial, V. (2008). "How Much Does Turnover Matter? Evidence from Indonesian Manufacturing 
Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1975-95." Oxford Development Studies 36(3): 295-322. 
Vial, V. & Hanoteau, J. (2010). "Corruption, manufacturing plant growth and the Asian paradox: 
Micro-level evidence from Indonesia", World Development, 38(5): 693-705 
Wengel, J. t. and E. R. Rodriguez (2006). "Productivity and Firm Dynamics: creative Destruction 
in Indonesian Manufacturing, 1994–2000." Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 42(3): 341-
355. 
13 
 
Westhead, P. and M. Cowling (1998). "Family Firm Research: The Need for a Methodological 
Rethink." Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 23(1): 31-56. 
World Bank enterprise survey Indonesia 2003; 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/CustomQuery/Country.aspx?economyid=90&year=2003&chara
cteristic=sector&tab=0 
 
14 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: Logit model on MFB existence in households 
 
 
Table 2: Demographic data based on a sample of IFLS 
 
15 
 
Table 3: Cox Hazard Model 
 
Table 4: Long-term effect of MFB on households’ assets 
 
